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Abstract: In his Commentary on Boethius’ De 
Trinitate 3.1, Aquinas cites Maimonides as 
giving fi ve reasons for the need for faith. Yet 
interpreters tend to see Aquinas as “stand-
ing Maimonides on his head”. In this paper, 
the author places Maimonides’ text (on the 
five reasons for concealing metaphysics) 
within the context of his rational mysticism 
and compares it to Aquinas’ own Christian 
mystical thought in an attempt to show that 
in his own mind Aquinas is not misquoting, 
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ides’ natural, rational mysticism with what he 
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      INTRODUCTION
n his Super Boethium De Trinitate 3.1, Aquinas gives fi ve reasons 
for why it is necessary for humans to have religious faith.1 Quite 
surprisingly, he confi dently attributes these fi ve reasons to Mai-
monides: “[I]t is necessary to have faith for fi ve reasons, which Rabbi 
Moses posits.”2 The Leonine editors cite Maimonides’ Dux perplexo-
rum 1.33 as Aquinas’ source for these fi ve reasons for the need for 
faith.3 Yet when one turns to this passage in Maimonides’ The Guide 
for the Perplexed, one immediately sees that he appears to be giving 
the same fi ve reasons for what his interpreters4 commonly call his 
‘intellectual elitism’, namely, the view that the study of metaphysics, 
which Maimonides considers to be the ultimate path to human per-
fection, must be restricted to the learned and must be hidden from 
the unlearned masses. Hence, this text of Maimonides is generally 
1. See also THOMAS AQUINAS, In III Sent. d. 24, a. 3, q. 3, sol. 1; De veritate q. 14, 
a. 10. Cf. P. SYNAVE, La Révélation des vérités divines naturelles d’après Saint Thomas 
d’Aquin, “Mélanges Mandonnet” vol. 1 (Vrin, Paris, 1930) 327-70; R. IMBACH, 
Ut ait Rabbi Moyses: Maimonidesche Philosopheme bei Thomas von Aquin und 
Meister Eckhart, “Collectanea Franciscana” 60 (1990) 105-6. 
2. THOMAS AQUINAS, Super Boetium De Trinitate (henceforth, In BDT) q. 3, a. 1, co., in 
Opera omnia iussu impensaque Leonis XIII P. M. edita, t. 50: Super Boetium De Trini-
tate (Commissio Leonina-Éditions Du Cerf, Roma-Paris, 1992) : “[N]ecessarium est 
habere fi dem propter quinque rationes, quas Rabbi Moyses ponit.” All translations of 
Aquinas’ texts are my own.
3. See Ibid.
4. See, for example, D. BLUMENTHAL, Maimonides: Prayer, Worship, and Mysticism, in 
R. Goetsche (ed.), Prière, Mystique, et Judaïsme (Presses Universitaires de France, 
Paris, 1987) 89-106; D. MCCALLUM, Maimonides’ Guide for the Perplexed: Silence 
and Salvation (Routledge, New York, 2007) Ch. 1; T. RUDAVSKY, Maimonides 
(Wiley-Blackwell, Chichester, 2010) Ch. 1. For an excellent account of Maimo-
nides’ debt to his Arab predecessors that places a strong emphasis on the sources 
for his elitism and related views such as the interpretation of Scripture, see S. PES-
SIN, The Infl uence of Islamic Thought on Maimonides, “The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy” Summer (2014), in E. N. ZALTA (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/sum2014/entries/maimonides-islamic/. The notion of elitism in Mai-
monides is part of the much broader and more complex issue of esotericism in 
Maimonidean studies, which space constraints do not allow me to address here. 
For a good review of the literature on esotericism in Maimonides, see K. SEESKIN, 
Searching for a Distant God: The Legacy of Maimonides (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford - New York, 2000) Appendix: “Esotericism and the Limits of Knowledge: 
A Critique of Strauss.”
I
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seen—and I would agree—as an expression of his intellectual elit-
ism. But assuming that this elitism, so characteristic of Maimonides, 
is not present in Aquinas, many interpreters have been inclined to 
read Aquinas’ text on the fi ve reasons for the need for faith as at best 
a generous adaptation, and at worst a misappropriation or rever-
sal, of Maimonides’ thought. For example, Ernest Léonard Fortin 
believes Maimonides and Aquinas in their corresponding texts are 
giving fi ve reasons for widely divergent positions.5 Bernard McGinn 
goes as far as saying that Aquinas is “standing Maimonides on his 
head,” in the sense that his use of Maimonides is as a reversal (albeit 
a “benign reversal”) of Maimonides’ own thought.6
In this paper, however, I place Maimonides’ text on the fi ve 
reasons for concealing metaphysics within the context of his ra-
tional mysticism and compare it to Aquinas’ own Christian mysti-
cal thought. I attempt to show that Aquinas is making a legitimate 
appropriation of Maimonides’ own ‘fi ve reasons’: he simply tones 
down Maimonides’ strict elitism (adopting a more moderate sort 
5. E. L. FORTIN, Classical Christianity and the Political Order: Refl ections on the Theo-
logico-political Problem (Rowman & Littlefi eld Publishers, Lanham, 1996) 153: 
“Equally revealing from the same point of view is the fact that the reasons which 
Maimonides had invoked to justify the concealing of philosophic truths from the 
multitude could be used by Aquinas to show instead why, in addition to super-
natural truths, God has seen fi t to reveal certain natural truths or truths that are 
accessible to human reason and experience alone.”
6. B. MCGINN, Sapientia Judaeorum: The Role of Jewish Philosophers in Some Scholastic 
Thinkers, in R. J. BAST, A. C. GOW (eds.), Continuity and Change: The Harvest of 
Late Medieval and Reformation History: Essays Presented to Heiko A. Oberman on 
His 70th Birthday (Brill, Leiden, 2000) 206-228, at 218: “Thomas frequently dis-
agrees with Maimonides, though always with respect. Even more revealing is 
the fact that when he agrees with Maimonides he often does so within the con-
text of making a point that “stands Maimonides on his head,” so to speak. In a 
brief presentation I can do no more than to give one example of each procedure, 
starting with the “benign reversal” appropriation. In Guide 1.33-34 Maimonides 
discussed why the truths of divine science are hidden under the parables of the 
Torah…. Maimonides goes on to spell out fi ve reasons for this… Maimonides’ 
point is to underlie the esotericism of divine science…. Thomas Aquinas quotes 
Maimonides’ fi ve reasons three times in the course of his writings, but to quite 
a different effect…. Aquinas emphasizes that [natural truths] are taught by faith 
precisely in order to make them accessible to all, as far as possible, rather than 
as a means of restricting them to an intellectual elite…. So the reasons that Mai-
monides sees for restricting truth to the few are adapted by Thomas Aquinas as 
arguments for the fi ttingness of revealing truth to all.”
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of elitism) and emphasizes the need for the faith. In his own mind 
Aquinas is not misquoting, reversing, or doing violence to Maimon-
ides’ text as much as completing it with what he views as the super-
natural perfection of the theological virtue of faith.
My paper will be divided into two sections. First (I), I shall 
present Maimonides’ ‘fi ve reasons’ for concealing metaphysics 
from common people in context in order to show that they are also 
reasons for why faith in some of the conclusions of metaphysics is 
necessary for common people. Then (II), I shall turn to the text in 
Aquinas where he cites Maimonides’ ‘fi ve reasons’. This section will 
be divided into three parts: (A) I shall review the epistemological 
presuppositions that Aquinas discusses before citing Maimonides; 
(B) I shall present Aquinas text on the ‘fi ve reasons’ in its ethical-
mystical context; and (C) I shall discuss the theological conclusion 
which Aquinas draws at the end of the text in order to show how he 
believes he is completing Maimonides’ thought with a supernatural 
perspective of the faith.
I. MAIMONIDES’ STRICT INTELLECTUAL ELITISM 
AND THE NEED FOR FAITH
It is well known that in the fi rst book of his Guide for the Perplexed 
Maimonides conceives metaphysics not only as the highest sci-
ence—a common view within the Aristotelian tradition—but also as 
the highest mystical path to God and hence the ultimate human per-
fection. The practitioner of Maimonides’ rational mysticism aims to 
attain an understanding of what others conceive only through the 
metaphorical language of religion:
When a man attains to perfection, and arrives at a knowledge 
of the ‘secrets of the Law’, either through the assistance of a 
teacher or by self-instruction, being led by the understanding 
of one part to the study of the other, he will belong to those 
who faithfully believe in the true principles, either because of 
conclusive proof, where proof is possible, or by forcible argu-
ments, where argument is admissible; he will have a true no-
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tion of those things which he previously received in similes and 
metaphors, and he will fully understand their sense.7
This path requires much preparation and perseverance, for those 
who aspire to the mystical perfection of the metaphysician must 
traverse a long course of preparatory studies, which culminates in 
metaphysics only at the end of their lives: “[H]e who wishes to at-
tain to human perfection, must therefore fi rst study logic, next the 
various branches of mathematics in their proper order, then physics, 
and lastly metaphysics.”8 Maimonides then explains at some length 
why each discipline is necessary as a preamble to the study of meta-
physics. Most people will be wearied by the length of the process, 
and will not wish to undergo the process. Even among those who 
begin it, most do not persevere. Yet this is the only way to reach the 
goal: “The preparatory studies are of long duration, and man, in his 
natural desire to reach the goal, fi nds them frequently too weari-
some, and does not wish to be troubled by them....”9 Therefore, 
common people are not fi t for Maimonides’ rational mysticism. In 
fact, for most people, attempting to take this path will result in in-
fi delity:
He, however, who begins with metaphysics, will not only be-
come confused in matters of religion, but will fall into com-
plete infi delity. I compare such a person to an infant fed with 
wheaten bread, meat and wine; it will undoubtedly die, not 
because such food is naturally unfi t for the human body, but 
because of the weakness of the child, who is unable to digest 
the food, and cannot derive benefi t from it. The same is the 
case with the true principles of science. They were presented 
in enigmas, dad in riddles, and taught by wise men in the most 
mysterious way that could be devised, not because they contain 
7. MAIMONIDES, Guide for the Perplexed (henceforth, GP) 1.33, in M. FRIEDLANDER 
(trans.), The Guide for the Perplexed by Moses Maimonides, 2nd ed. (Routledge, Lon-
don, 1904).
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
FRANCISCO ROMERO CARRASQUILLO
84 ANUARIO FILOSÓFICO 48/1 (2015) 79-102
some secret evil, or are contrary to the fundamental principles 
of the Law (as fools think who are only philosophers in their 
own eyes), but because of the incapacity of man to comprehend 
them at the beginning of his studies: only slight allusions have 
been made to them to serve for the guidance of those who are 
capable of understanding them....10
This rational mystical path, then, is couched in what I would call a 
strict intellectual elitism, the view that human perfection and union 
with God is reserved exclusively to an intellectual elite; that only a 
privileged few may be granted mystical access to God through an 
arduous process of learning the sciences, a process that culminates 
in metaphysics: “As regards the privileged few, ‘the remnant whom 
the Lord calls’ (Joel 3.5), they only attain the perfection at which 
they aim after due preparatory labor.”11 Maimonides will go to great 
lengths to argue that his rational-mystical path should not be taught 
to the common people, or even to beginners in the path, devoting 
two chapters of his to this task. The idea is mentioned explicitly at 
least seven times throughout the course of the two chapters. 
(1) [I]t is very injurious to begin with this branch of philoso-
phy, viz., Metaphysics....12 
(2) [I]t is necessary to initiate the young and to instruct the less 
intelligent according to their comprehension: those who 
appear to be talented and to have capacity for the higher 
method of study, i.e., that based on proof and on true 
logical argument, should be gradually advanced towards 
perfection, either by tuition or by self-instruction....13 
(3) He, however, who begins with metaphysics, will not only 
become confused in matters of religion, but will fall into 
complete infi delity....14
10. Ibid.
11. GP 1.34.
12. GP 1.33. 
13. Ibid. 
14. Ibid. 
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(4) We have frequently mentioned in this treatise the prin-
ciple of our Sages ‘not to discuss the Ma’aseh Mercabah 
even in the presence of one pupil, except he be wise and 
intelligent; and then only the headings of the chapters 
are to be given to him.’ We must, therefore, begin with 
teaching these subjects according to the capacity of the 
pupil, and on two conditions, fi rst, that he be wise, i.e., 
that he should have successfully gone through the pre-
liminary studies, and secondly that he be intelligent, tal-
ented, clear-headed, and of quick perception, that is, ‘have 
a mind of his own’ (mebin midda’ato), as our Sages termed 
it.15
(5) [I]nstruction should not begin with metaphysics, but 
should at fi rst be restricted to pointing out what is fi t-
ted for notice and what may be made manifest to the 
multitude....16 
(6) As regards the privileged few, ‘the remnant whom the 
Lord calls’ (Joel 3.5), they only attain the perfection at 
which they aim after due preparatory labor. The necessity 
of such a preparation and the need of such a training for 
the acquisition of real knowledge, has been plainly stated 
by King Solomon in the following words: ‘If the iron be 
blunt, and he do not whet the edge, then must he put to 
more strength: and it is profi table to prepare for wisdom’ 
(Eccles. 10.10): ‘Hear counsel, and receive instruction, 
that thou mayest be wise in thy latter end’ (Prov. 19. 20).17
(7) For these reasons it was proper that the study of meta-
physics should have been exclusively cultivated by privi-
leged persons, and not entrusted to the common people. 
It is not for the beginner, and he should abstain from it, 
as the little child has to abstain from taking solid food and 
from carrying heavy weights.18
15. Ibid. 
16. GP 1.34. 
17. Ibid. 
18. Ibid. 
FRANCISCO ROMERO CARRASQUILLO
86 ANUARIO FILOSÓFICO 48/1 (2015) 79-102
It is within this context that Maimonides gives the ‘fi ve reasons’ 
why metaphysics ought to be hidden from the common people—and 
which Aquinas will later cite as being reasons for the need for faith. 
The fi ve reasons occupy the entirety of Ch. 34 of Book 1 (and for rea-
sons of space I shall not reproduce them), but they can be summarized 
as follows: (1) The subject itself of metaphysics is too diffi cult, subtle, 
and profound for the common people; (2) the intelligence of pupils 
is at fi rst insuffi cient for understanding it; (3) the preparatory studies 
are of long duration and few persevere; (4) the physical constitution 
of particular human beings is an obstacle (some are too young, others 
too passionate, etc.); and (5) most people are disturbed from intel-
lectual occupations by their human needs. That these are reasons for 
hiding metaphysics from common people is clear from the text that 
precedes the chapter on the fi ve reasons:
I will now proceed to explain the reasons why we should not 
instruct the multitude in pure metaphysics, or begin with de-
scribing to them the true essence of things, or with showing 
them that a thing must be as it is, and cannot be otherwise. 
This will form the subject of the next chapter....19
Then he immediately opens the chapter on the fi ve reasons saying: 
“There are fi ve reasons why instruction should not begin with meta-
physics, but should at fi rst be restricted to pointing out what is fi tted 
for notice and what may be made manifest to the multitude....”20 He 
also concludes the chapter recalling the purpose. 
Now, given this context, we can ask: Is it fair to say that Aquinas, 
in citing these as reasons why faith is necessary, is misappropriating 
Maimonides’ thought, or “standing Maimonides on his head,”21 or 
that his citation of Maimonides involves a reversal of Maimonides’ 
thought? It would defi nitely be a misappropriation or even a reversal 
if Maimonides were merely trying to argue here that metaphysics 
19. GP 1.33.
20. GP 1.34.
21. Cf. B. MCGINN, Sapientia Judaeorum, 218.
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must be hidden from the common people. But he is actually going 
further than that. He is also arguing that it is necessary for the com-
mon people to have non-rational access to some of those metaphysi-
cal truths which lie at the end the rational path. Granted that this 
is not the emphasis in Chs. 33 and 34 of Book 1, it is nonetheless 
mentioned in passing at least a few times. For example, he says that 
without belief in God’s existence and incorporeality, only very few 
people would ever come to know these things, for few engage in the 
process of learning, and even fewer people persevere, the effect being 
that most people would die without knowing of God at all:
Now, if no knowledge whatever had been given to us by means 
of tradition, and if we had not been brought to the belief in 
a thing through the medium of similes, we would have been 
bound to form a perfect notion of things with their essential 
characteristics, and to believe only what we could prove: a goal 
which could only be attained by long preparation. In such a 
case most people would die, without having known whether 
there was a God or not, much less that certain things must be 
asserted about Him, and other things denied as defects. From 
such a fate not even “one of a city or two of a family” (Jer. 3:14) 
would have escaped.22
In fact, for that very purpose was the Torah written, so that com-
mon people, for whom the path of metaphysics amounts to infi del-
ity, can have access through faith to those truths that they need to 
believe:
[I]t is the object of the Torah to serve as a guide for the instruc-
tion of the young, of women, and of the common people; and 
as all of them are incapable of comprehending the true sense 
of the words, tradition was considered suffi cient to convey all 
truths which were to be established.23 
22. GP 1.34.
23. GP 1.33.
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Thus Maimonides may not be emphatic in these two chapters 
on the need for faith, but he clearly does have the issue in mind. 
Now, if we turn to the following chapter, Ch. 35, we in fact 
see a shift in emphasis. Now Maimonides focuses directly on the 
need for faith for common people. He insists that some basic doc-
trines about God and his relation to creation ought not to be hid-
den from the common people, but should be taught to them to the 
extent of their capacity.
[I]n the same way as all people must be informed, and even 
children must be trained in the belief that God is One, and 
that none besides Him is to be worshipped, so must all be 
taught by simple authority that God is incorporeal... (a long 
list of divine attributes follows). This suffi ces for the guid-
ance of children and of ordinary persons who must believe.... 
But the question concerning the attributes of God, their in-
admissibility...; concerning the Creation, His Providence...; 
all these things are very diffi cult problems, the true ‘Secrets of 
the Law’... the subjects of which we should only mention the 
headings of the chapters... and only in the presence of a person 
satisfying the above-named conditions.24 
He also insists that unintelligent people must be told that God is 
one and incorporeal, and that He alone is to be worshipped: 
That God is incorporeal, that He cannot be compared with 
His creatures, that He is not subject to external infl uence; 
these are things which must be explained to every one accord-
ing to his capacity, and they must be taught by way of tradition 
to children and women, to the stupid and ignorant, as they are 
taught that God is One, that He is eternal, and that He alone 
is to be worshipped.... When persons have received this doc-
trine, and have been trained in this belief... the writings of the 
Prophets... must be made clear and explained to them.... Their 
24. GP 1.35.
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belief in the unity of God and in the words of the Prophets 
will then be a true and perfect belief. Those who are not suf-
fi ciently intelligent to comprehend the true interpretation of 
these passages in the Bible, or to understand that the same 
term admits of two different interpretations, may simply be 
told that the scriptural passage is clearly understood by the 
wise, but that they should content themselves with knowing 
that God is incorporeal (etc.).... This may suffi ce for that class 
of persons, and it is not proper to leave them in the belief that 
God is corporeal, or that He has any of the properties of mate-
rial objects, just as there is no need to leave them in the belief 
that God does not exist, that there are more Gods than one, 
or that any other being may be worshipped.25
Thus if we interpret the chapter on the “fi ve reasons” in con-
text—as Aquinas surely did—we clearly see that Maimonides 
designed it as a defense of his intellectual elitism (and hence his 
rational mysticism), and that in the process he nuances this un-
derstanding by mentioning the need for faith for common people 
and beginners in the rational path. The emphasis is clearly on his 
intellectual elitism, but the theme of the need for faith nonethe-
less emerges as a secondary, though closely related, point, which 
he discusses more fully in Ch. 35. It is perhaps this secondary 
emphasis which interpreters such as Fortin and McGinn have not 
seen or acknowledged.
But what about the legitimacy of Aquinas’ use of Maimonides 
for his own purposes? Assuming that Aquinas does not hold to an 
elitism of the sort that Maimonides defends, is his appropriation 
of Maimonides’ fi ve reasons legitimate? Now I shall move on to 
consider how Aquinas appropriates Maimonides’ ‘fi ve reasons’ by 
arguing that he indeed tones down, but does not deny altogether, 
Maimonides’ elitism, and places the main emphasis of his discus-
sion on the need for faith.
25. Ibid.
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II. AQUINAS’ MODERATE ELITISM AND THE NEED FOR FAITH
In his Commentary on Boethius’ De Trinitate, Aquinas asks whether 
faith is necessary for humankind. The gist of the response will be 
that although some ‘divine things’ (divina) can be known scientifi -
cally (scita) by a few people dedicated to the sciences, there are none-
theless some doctrines such as the Trinity that cannot be known 
at all without faith. Therefore, everyone will need faith: common 
people on account of both types of truth, and the learned on account 
of the kind of truth that can only be known by faith. 
Yet what interests us here the most is how Aquinas gets to this 
conclusion. In explaining how most people have access to truths of 
the latter kind, namely to those that can be known scientifi cally only 
by some, he rests on Maimonides’ text discussed above, attributing 
to him fi ve reasons why it is necessary for common people to have 
faith in some of the truths of metaphysics: “[I]t is necessary to have 
faith for fi ve reasons, which Rabbi Moses posits.”26 Then he utilizes 
this philosophical discussion to reach the properly theological con-
clusion that analogously everyone, even the trained metaphysician, 
needs to have faith in revealed doctrines, for they cannot be known 
otherwise. But his argument for the need for faith is far more com-
plex than that of Maimonides, and involves a discussion of (A) basic 
epistemological presuppositions, (B) their applications to Aquinas’ 
religious ethics, and (C) to Aquinas’ theology.
A. Epistemological presuppositions
Aquinas begins the body of his lengthy response by offering an epis-
temological analysis of the concept of faith in general—as applicable 
to both human and religious faith. He follows Hugh of St. Victor in 
arguing that faith is epistemologically midway between knowledge 
(scientia) and understanding (intellectus) on the one hand, and opin-
ion (opinio) on the other: for all faith is in some way a ‘fi xed assent’ 
without fear of the opposite being true, and this it has in common 
26. In BDT q. 3, a. 1, co., quoted above in note 2.
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with knowledge; whereas at the same time it concerns those things 
that are not accessible to our understanding, and this it has in com-
mon with opinion: 
[F]aith has something in common with opinion, and something 
in common with knowledge and understanding, by reason of 
which it holds a position midway between opinion and un-
derstanding or science, according to Hugh of St. Victor. In 
common with understanding and knowledge, it possesses cer-
tain and fi xed assent; and in this it differs from opinion, which 
accepts one of two opposites, though with fear that the other 
may be true, and on account of this doubt it fl uctuates be-
tween two contraries. But, in common with opinion, faith is 
concerned with things that are not naturally accessible to our 
understanding, and in this respect it differs from science and 
understanding.27
After giving a brief account of the social need for human faith in 
contingent matters such as history, Aquinas moves on to discuss the 
intelligibility of ‘divine and necessary’ (i.e., metaphysical) truths and 
our ability to know them. He explains that there is an order to our 
knowledge: 
The truth of things may also not be evident because of defect 
on our part, as in the case of divine and necessary things which, 
according to their own nature, are most knowable. Therefore, 
to understand them, we are not capable of immediate intellec-
27. In BDT q. 3, a. 1, co.: “Dicendum quod fi des habet aliquid commune cum opi-
nione et aliquid cum scientia et intellectu, ratione cuius ponitur media inter 
scientiam et opinionem ab Hugone de sancto Victore. Cum scientia siquidem et 
intellectu commune habet certum et fi xum assensum, in quo ab opinione differt, 
quae accipit alterum contrariorum cum formidine alterius, et a dubitatione quae 
fl uctuat inter duo contraria. Sed cum opinione commune habet quod est de rebus 
quae non sunt intellectui pervia, in quo differt a scientia et intellectu.” Cf. Summa 
theologiae (henceforth ST), II-II, q. 2, a. 1, in Opera omnia iussu impensaque Leonis 
XIII P. M. edita, t. 8-10: Secunda secundae Summae theologiae (Ex Typographia Poly-
glotta S. C. de Propaganda Fide, Romae, 1895-1897-1899).
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tion, from the very beginning, since it is in accordance with 
our nature to attain from things less knowable and posterior 
in themselves, to knowledge of those that are themselves more 
knowable and prior.28
Aquinas is here relying on the Aristotelian epistemological prin-
ciple, taken from Physics 1, that in order to acquire knowledge we 
must proceed from what is better known to us (though less intel-
ligible in itself) to what is less known to us (though more intelligible 
in itself).29 As can be seen from the context of the article, by ‘those 
things that are better known to us’ Aquinas means sensible knowl-
edge of natural reality, whereas when he says ‘those things that are 
less known to us but more intelligible in themselves’ he is thinking 
of the conclusions of metaphysics, especially truths about God, His 
existence and His nature. Speaking of ‘divine things’ (diviva), he 
states that: “It is possible for humans to come to the full knowledge 
of certain of these things by way of reason even in the state of this 
life.... [S]cientifi c knowledge (scientia) can be had of these, and is had 
by some....”30 Yet the process that one must engage in in order to 
reach knowledge of these things is arduous, as it involves an entire 
curriculum of studies that begins with many preambles and culmi-
nates in the study of metaphysics. Here Aquinas is clearly following 
Maimonides without citing him. Elsewhere he says more explic-
itly that students should fi rst start with logic, then mathematics, 
then natural philosophy, then moral philosophy, and fi nally divine 
science—an order that closely resembles that laid out by Maimo-
nides, the only exception being the addition of moral philosophy 
28. In BDT q. 3, a. 1, co.: “Ex defectu vero nostro sunt non apparentia res divinae et 
necessariae, quae sunt secundum naturam maxime notae. Unde ad harum inspec-
tionem non sumus statim a principio idonei, cum oporteat nos ex minus notis et 
posterioribus secundum naturam in magis nota et priora naturaliter pervenire.”
29. Cf. In Phys., L. 1, lect. 1, nos. 6-7, in Opera omnia iussu impensaque Leonis XIII. 
P. M. edita, t. 2: Commentaria in octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis (Ex Typographia 
Polyglotta S. C. de Propaganda Fide, Romae, 1884).
30. In BDT q. 3, a. 1, co.: “Ad quorum quaedam plene cognoscenda possibile est 
homini pervenire per viam rationis etiam in statu huius vitae.... [P]ossit haberi 
scientia et a quibusdam habeatur....”
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to the list.31 Divine science, namely, metaphysics, which “considers 
the fi rst causes of things,” is the crowning of the process of human 
learning, and thus lies at the end of the path. For this reason—Aqui-
nas says—philosophers saw it appropriate to leave the study of this 
science to the last period of their lives.
Now, what is novel here is that Aquinas complements this 
doctrine with an important nuance: he adds that the knowledge of 
divine (or metaphysical) realities, which are less known to us and 
more intelligible in themselves—and hence last known by us—can 
shed important light on the immediate, sensible reality which we 
know fi rst. Therefore, Aquinas argues, it is convenient to have some 
knowledge of those divine and necessary truths even at the begin-
ning of the process.
But since those things that we learn fi rst (quae primo cognosci-
mus) are known (sunt nota) by virtue of those things that we 
learn last (quae ultimo cognoscimus), it is necessary for us even 
from the beginning to be acquainted (habere notitiam) with 
those things that are most known.32
This is where the need for faith comes in. Beginners in the process of 
learning can benefi t even at this stage from having some awareness 
of what comes last in the process, yet scientifi cally they cannot ‘skip’ 
to the end of the process; at this stage they cannot yet scientifi cally 
31. Cf. In Librum de causis, proem., n. 3, in H. D. SAFFREY (ed.), Super librum De 
Causis exposition (Société Philosophique-Nauwelaerts, Fribourg-Louvain, 1954): 
“Et inde est quod philosophorum intentio ad hoc principaliter erat ut, per omnia 
quae in rebus considerabant, ad cognitionem primarum causarum pervenirent. 
Unde scientiam de primis causis ultimo ordinabant, cuius considerationi ultimum 
tempus suae vitae deputarent: primo quidem incipientes a logica quae modum 
scientiarum tradit, secundo procedentes ad mathematicam cuius etiam pueri pos-
sunt esse capaces, tertio ad naturalem philosophiam quae propter experientiam 
tempore indiget, quarto autem ad moralem philosophiam cuius iuvenis esse con-
veniens auditor non potest, ultimo autem scientiae divinae insistebant quae con-
siderat primas entium causas.”
32. In BDT q. 3, a. 1, co.: “Sed quia ex vi illorum, quae ultimo cognoscimus, sunt 
nota illa quae primo cognoscimus, oportet etiam a principio aliquam nos habere 
notitiam de illis quae sunt per se magis nota....”
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know those things that are known last, without fi rst going through 
the entire learning process. Thus, at the beginner stage, pupils can 
have access to these ‘divine and necessary’ truths only through faith. 
As Aquinas pithily states, this “can only happen by believing.”33
As though assuring us that this should not be surprising, Aqui-
nas points out that this same phenomenon occurs in the case of 
the sciences, which are learned according to the order described 
above. Those who are at the beginning of the process of learning, 
who are studying the preambles to metaphysics (i.e., Logic, Math-
ematics, Natural Philosophy, etc.), are required to suppose certain 
metaphysical truths in order to be able to advance in their studies:
And this is evident even in the order of the sciences; since that 
science which is concerned with highest causes, namely, meta-
physics, comes last in human knowledge; yet in sciences that 
are preambles to it there must be supposed certain truths which 
only in it are more fully revealed; therefore every science has 
some suppositions that must be believed in order to carry on 
the process of learning.34 
B. Applications to Aquinas’ religious ethics 
At this point in the discussion Aquinas brings out the ethical and 
mystical implications of the epistemological doctrine he has re-
viewed thus far. He reminds the reader that the end of human life 
is beatitude, which he says consists in the full knowledge of divine 
(i.e., metaphysical) realities. But human beings must have awareness 
of their end in order for them to direct their actions towards that 
end—a claim consistent with the Aristotelian dictum that what is 
last in the order of execution (the end) comes fi rst in the order of 
33. Ibid.: “quod fi eri non potest nisi credendo.”
34. In BDT q. 3, a. 1, co.: “Et etiam hoc patet in ordine scientiarum, quia scientia quae est de 
causis altissimis, scilicet metaphysica, ultimo occurrit homini ad cognoscendum, et tamen 
in scientiis praeambulis oportet quod supponantur quaedam quae in illa plenius innotes-
cunt; unde quaelibet scientia habet suppositiones, quibus oportet addiscentem credere.”
ANUARIO FILOSÓFICO 48/1 (2015) 79-102
INTELLECTUAL ELITISM AND THE NEED FOR FAITH
95
intention.35 It follows, then, that in order for humans to direct their 
actions towards beatitude they must have some awareness of this 
beatitude from the outset. Faith is what makes this possible. Even 
though certain truths relating to beatitude are knowable through 
reason, these are not knowable by the majority of humans, and es-
pecially not at the outset. He makes this explicit in a text I partially 
quoted above:
Since, therefore, the end of human life is beatitude, which con-
sists in the full cognition of divine things, in order that human 
life be directed to beatitude it is necessary immediately from 
the beginning to have faith in those divine things which are ex-
pected to be fully known in the ultimate [state of] human per-
fection.  It is possible for humans to come to the full knowledge 
of certain of these things by way of reason even in the state of 
this life. And although scientifi c knowledge (scientia) can be 
had of these, and is had by some, nevertheless having faith [in 
them] is necessary for fi ve reasons, which Rabbi Moses gives.36
Aquinas, then, is presenting the need for faith in naturally-knowable 
divine truths in ethical-mystical terms. Faith in the conclusions of 
metaphysics is necessary for human beings because it is the only way 
in which they can know these divine things at the outset, which is a 
prerequisite for directing their actions towards that end. 
And it is in this context that Aquinas introduces Maimonides’ 
‘fi ve reasons’. The list of reasons given by Aquinas is in fact a rather 
accurate paraphrase of Maimonides’ much longer text; yet he will 
complement each of the fi ve reasons with a comment on how it im-
plies that faith is necessary for attaining human beatitude. The fi rst 
reason is taken almost verbatim from Maimonides: (1) metaphysics 
35. Cf. ST I-II, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1.
36. In BDT q. 3, a. 1, co.: “Cum ergo fi nis humanae vitae sit beatitudo, quae consistit in 
plena cognitione divinorum, necessarium est ad humanam vitam in beatitudinem 
dirigendam statim a principio habere fi dem divinorum, quae plene cognoscenda ex-
spectantur in ultima perfectione humana. Ad quorum quaedam plene cognoscenda 
possibile est homini pervenire per viam ratio.”
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is too profound and subtle for most humans. Aquinas here simply 
adds that this diffi culty results in divine (metaphysical) truths being 
hidden from most people, but that faith resolves this problem by 
making the knowledge of these things accessible to all.
[Faith is necessary] fi rst, on account of the depth and subtlety 
of the matter, by which divine things are hidden from human 
understanding. Therefore, lest any man be without some 
knowledge of them, provision is made that through faith, at 
least, he know divine truths. Therefore, in Eccles. 7:25 it is 
said: “It is a great depth, who shall fi nd it out?”37
Aquinas’ second reason is also exactly as it is found in Maimonides: 
(2) the weakness of young minds. Yet Aquinas adds that, as a result 
of their weakness, faith is necessary to them, so that even at their 
early age they may have access to these important truths, and thus 
may order their lives towards beatitude:
Secondly, on account of the weakness of the human intellect 
from the beginning. For perfection of knowledge does not be-
long to the human intellect except at the end; therefore, that 
it should at no time lack a knowledge of God, it requires faith 
by which it may accept divine truths from the very beginning.38 
Aquinas paraphrases Maimonides’ third reason by saying that know-
ing God by reason requires knowledge of too many “preambles”39 
(Maimonides had spoken of “preparatory studies” as being of “long 
duration”). St. Thomas adds that since few would be able to com-
37. Ibid.: “[N]ecessarium est habere fi dem propter quinque rationes, quas Rabbi Moy-
ses ponit. Prima scilicet propter profunditatem et subtilitatem materiae, per quam 
occultantur divina ab hominum intellectu. Unde ne sit homo sine eorum quali-
cumque cognitione, provisum est ei ut saltem per fi dem divina cognoscat, Eccl. 
7: alta profunditas, quis cognoscet illam?”
38. Ibid.: “Secunda propter imbecillitatem intellectus humani a principio. Non enim 
provenit ei sua perfectio nisi in fi ne; et ideo ut nullum tempus sit ei vacuum a 
divina cognitione, indiget fi de, per quam ab ipso principio divina accipiat.”
39. Cf. ST I, q. 2, a. 2, ad 1.
ANUARIO FILOSÓFICO 48/1 (2015) 79-102
INTELLECTUAL ELITISM AND THE NEED FOR FAITH
97
prehend all these sciences, faith in the conclusions of metaphysics 
is necessary so that all may have knowledge of divine (metaphysical) 
realities and thus may seek beatitude: 
Thirdly, because of the many preambles that are required for 
a knowledge of God according to reason. For this there is 
needed knowledge of almost all the sciences, since cognition 
of divine things is the end of them all. But few indeed would 
comprehend these preambulatory truths or investigate them 
completely. Therefore, lest large numbers of men should be 
left without knowledge of divine things, the way of faith has 
been provided by God Himself.40 
The fourth and fi fth reasons are essentially the same as those given 
by Maimonides—some are unfi t for metaphysics, others are too 
busy—and from these reasons he infers that faith is necessary so 
that all may have knowledge of divine metaphysical realities for the 
purpose of ordering their lives towards beatitude: 
In the fourth place, many men on account of their natural con-
stitution are unfi tted for perfect intellectual investigation ac-
cording to reason; therefore, that these might not lack knowl-
edge of divine things, the way of faith has been provided. In the 
fi fth place, because of numerous occupations with which men 
are busied, it would be impossible for all of them to discover, 
by way of reason, necessary truth in regard to God, and on this 
account the way of faith has been established, both as regards 
things that might in some way be known and as regards those 
that required revelation in order that they be believed.41
40. In BDT q. 3, a. 1, co.: “Tertio propter multa praeambula, quae exiguntur ad 
habendam cognitionem de Deo secundum viam rationis. Requiritur enim ad hoc 
fere omnium scientiarum cognitio, cum omnium fi nis sit cognitio divinorum; 
quae quidem praeambula paucissimi consequuntur. Unde ne multitudo hominum 
a divina cognitione vacua remaneret, provisa est ei divinitus via fi dei.”
41. Ibid.: “Quinto propter occupationes plurimas, quibus oportet homines occupari; 
unde impossibile est quod omnes consequantur per viam rationis illud quod est de 
Deo necessarium ad cognoscendum, et propter hoc est via fi dei procurata, et hoc 
quantum ad illa quae sunt ab aliquibus scita et aliis proponuntur ut credenda.”
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Thus, we see that Aquinas reproduces Maimonides’ list of reasons 
why metaphysics is beyond the reach of most people, but rather than 
seeing the need for faith for common people as a secondary point, he 
reads it into the fi ve reasons themselves. The end result is that Aqui-
nas is toning down Maimonides’ elitism: he is focusing not so much 
on the negative aspect of why metaphysics is or ought to be hidden, 
but on the positive reason why people need faith in the divine truths 
that are knowable through metaphysics: “lest large numbers of men 
should be left without knowledge of divine things, the way of faith 
has been provided….”42 The elitism is thus toned down, but not 
altogether denied. Aquinas would obviously not want to argue for 
Maimonides’ strict elitism, namely, the idea that human perfection 
and union with God are reserved exclusively to an intellectual elite, 
because he believes that such union with God is achieved supernatu-
rally through grace; hence mystical access to God is open to anyone 
independently of their rational profi ciency. That is to say, Aquinas, 
unlike Maimonides, is opening up a path to perfection for all people. 
And in this respect I agree with McGinn: Aquinas’ emphasis is quite 
the opposite of that of Maimonides. But Aquinas still defends the 
view that rational access to some of the truths of metaphysics, such 
as knowledge of God’s attributes, is not open to common people, 
42. I would like to thank one of my anonymous reviewers for making me aware of a 
possible misunderstanding here. I am not claiming that for Aquinas faith is meant 
to be a path for common people only, or that the metaphysician does not need 
faith to reach beatitude. These claims would be contrary to Aquinas’ thought. 
As he himself states, “[I]n the case of certain divine truths, for a complete un-
derstanding of them the human mind in no way suffi ces… such is the truth of 
the Trinity and the unity of one God; and humans are led to knowledge of this, 
not in accordance with anything due their nature, but by divine grace alone. 
Therefore it is necessary that, for a perfection of knowledge of this kind, certain 
suppositions be proposed which must be believed at fi rst, and from these one is 
directed into full cognition of those truths which at the outset one held on faith, 
even as in other sciences also… And suppositions of this sort are those that must 
be believed by all, since in this life they are neither known nor understood by, any 
one” (q. 3, a. 1, co.). Yet the point that I am making here is simply that whereas 
the metaphysician can access these truths through faith and through metaphysics, 
non-metaphysicians can only access them through faith. See also R. McInerny, 
Praeambula Fidei: Thomism and the God of the Philosophers (The Catholic University 
of America Press, Washington, D.C., 2006).
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but is reserved to an intellectual elite. Common people can only 
access divine truths through faith. And in this respect at least we 
can speak of a certain type of intellectual elitism present in Aquinas 
in his appropriation of his ‘fi ve reasons’, even if it is an elitism in a 
looser sense than the one we fi nd in Maimonides. Hence, his argu-
ing for the need for faith is a way of moderating Maimonides’ elit-
ism, but without eliminating it altogether.
C. Applications to Aquinas’ theology
Thus far Aquinas has argued that common people need faith as a 
way of accessing the ‘divine truths’ of metaphysics, because they are 
unable or unwilling to undergo the training necessary to reach those 
truths scientifi cally. He is not arguing or even presupposing—at least 
not yet—that this faith is based on an actual supernatural revelation 
from God. In fact, the argument thus far works even if we understand 
‘faith’ in a human sense: common people can simply trust the ‘wise’ 
and have faith in what the wise have come to know scientifi cally about 
God. Thus, it could be argued that so far Aquinas’ argumentation 
has been kept within the sphere of philosophical reasoning, insofar 
as he has not yet introduced into his argument properly theological 
premises (that is, premises derived from Christian revelation). Even 
his claim that beatitude is the ultimate end of human beings can be 
understood in philosophical, Aristotelian terms. 
Now, at this point of the discussion he clearly begins to steer 
the argument towards its theological applications: he now wishes 
to argue for the need for faith, not in metaphysical truths that most 
people have no access to except via faith (elsewhere called the pre-
ambles of faith), but in revealed truths  that no one has access to other 
than via faith (the articles of faith).43 The entire goal of Aquinas’ text 
on the fi ve reasons for the need for faith is precisely to draw this 
conclusion, namely, that every human being needs faith in order to 
know the strictly revealed truths, the articles of faith.
43. Cf. ST I, q. 2, a. 2.
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His argument consists essentially in an analogy. He begins the 
argument by recalling the fact that a beginner in the sciences, in order 
to make progress, must presuppose certain things at the beginning 
which will be later understood fully. That is, within the curriculum 
of studies, those who are at the beginning must have ‘faith’ in certain 
metaphysical truths that can only be fully understood once they reach 
metaphysics at the end. Just as Aquinas used this example to argue for 
the need for faith in metaphysical conclusions on the part of the com-
mon people, who cannot do metaphysics, now he will use it to argue 
for the need for faith in truths not knowable by reason on the part of 
absolutely all people, including metaphysicians, because there is no 
other way to access them until the future life. 
But in the case of certain divine things, for a complete under-
standing of them the human mind in no way suffi ces, but full 
knowledge of them is to be awaited in that future life when 
there will be complete beatitude: such is the truth of the Trin-
ity and the unity of one God; and man is led to knowledge of 
this, not in accordance with anything due his nature, but by di-
vine grace alone. Therefore it is necessary that, for a perfection 
of knowledge of this kind, certain suppositions be proposed 
which must be believed at fi rst, and from these one is directed 
into full cognition of those truths which at the outset he held 
on faith, even as in other sciences also, as has been said. Hence 
in Is. 7:9 it is said, according to one translation: “Unless you 
believed, you would not understand.” And suppositions of this 
sort are those that must be believed by all, since in this life they 
are neither known nor understood by any one.44
44. Ibid.: “Quaedam vero divinorum sunt, ad quae plene cognoscenda nullatenus ra-
tio humana suffi cit, sed eorum plena cognitio exspectatur in futura vita, ubi erit 
plena beatitudo, sicut unitas et Trinitas unius Dei. Et ad hanc cognitionem homo 
perducetur non ex debito suae naturae, sed ex sola divina gratia. Unde oportet 
quod huius etiam perfectae scientiae quaedam suppositiones primo ei credendae 
proponantur, ex quibus dirigatur in plenam cognitionem eorum quae a principio 
credit, sicut et in aliis scientiis accidit, ut dictum est; et ideo dicitur Is. 7 secundum 
aliam litteram: nisi credideritis, non intelligetis. Et huiusmodi suppositiones sunt 
illa quae sunt credita quantum ad omnes et a nullo in hac vita scita vel intellecta.”
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Aquinas is here making a clever comparison between the belief in 
Christian revelation and pupils’ belief in metaphysical conclusions. 
Just as pupils must have faith in some metaphysical truths in order 
to be able to advance in their course of studies, so all humans must 
have faith in some divine truths in order to be able to advance to-
wards beatitude. Also, pupils do not yet scientifi cally know the truth 
of their metaphysical beliefs, so they must temporarily believe in 
order to be able to reach the point where they can scientifi cally 
know, through demonstration, what they previously believed. Simi-
larly, humans do not yet strictly speaking know the truth of their 
belief in those things that transcend human reason, so they must 
temporarily believe in order to be able to reach the point where they 
can strictly know through the beatifi c vision. 
Whatever the merits of this second, theological argument, it is 
important to stress that here Aquinas is no longer relying on Mai-
monides’ ‘fi ve reasons’ text. He used the text within its legitimate 
philosophical context. He now argued for his theological conclusion 
in a theological way, i.e., by introducing premises from Christian 
belief, namely that there are divine realities that cannot be known 
in this life except by revelation, that God has conveniently revealed 
at least some of them to humans, and that they will be more fully 
known in the next life. Hence, Aquinas may be reaching conclusions 
that the Maimonidean text does not warrant, but he is not relying 
exclusively on this text to argue for such conclusions.
CONCLUSION
I have presented a comparison between Maimonides’ Guide for the 
Perplexed 1.34 with Aquinas’ Commentary on Boethius’ De Trinitate 
3.1. In these texts each author gives ‘fi ve reasons’, but seemingly for 
different things: Maimonides gives fi ve reasons for why metaphysics 
should be hidden from common people, whereas Aquinas cites Mai-
monides as giving fi ve reasons for the need for faith. I have disagreed 
with scholars who have claimed that here Aquinas is misappropriating 
Maimonides, or “standing Maimonides on his head,” or that his use of 
Maimonides text is “reversal” of Maimonides’ own thought. Based on 
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the context of each of the two passages, I have carefully argued that: 
(1) Maimonides does present his fi ve reasons for hiding metaphysics 
as being also, albeit secondarily, reasons why faith is necessary for common
people; that (2) Aquinas is citing the text legitimately and is simply 
offering a more moderate version of Maimonides’ elitism, one that 
emphasizes its implications for the need for faith; and that (3) there-
fore, Aquinas’ citation of Maimonides is not so much a reversal or 
misinterpretation as much as an appropriation of a philosophical text 
for Aquinas’ own theological purposes, purposes which Aquinas seeks 
to accomplish through an argumentation that goes well beyond Mai-
monides’ text. Aquinas is, in short, completing Maimonides’ natural, 
rational mysticism with what he understands to be the supernatural 
perfection of the theological virtue of faith. 
